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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the extent to which recommendations made by the 
Cadbury Committee have affected UK company performance. The Committee 
recommended that certain internal monitoring mechanisms should be adopted 
by quoted firms because they were more effective than others as a means of 
promoting shareholder interests. The mechanisms analysed are duality, the 
number of outside directors on the board and the presence of a remuneration 
committee. We analyse the relationship between governance structures and 
performance for two years, 1992 and 1995. Using samples of 200 companies 
for each of the years, we find that the proportion of firms adopting the 
governance structures recommended by Cadbury has increased. However 
there is mixed evidence that the structures are associated with better 
performance. Depending on the choice of dependent variable, the presence of 
a remuneration committee has a positive effect on performance and outside 
director representation has a negative effect. However, there is evidence of a 
simultaneous relationship between outside director representation and 
performance, a result consistent with additional outside directors being 
appointed after a period of poor performance. Complete compliance with the 
model of governance proposed by the Cadbury Committee does not, 
however, appear to be associated with performance which is better than that 
achieved by either partial or non compliance.  
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Corporate performance and changes in governance characteristics: the 
impact of the Cadbury Committee’s recommendations on UK plcs 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the extent to which recommendations made by the 
Cadbury Committee have affected UK company performance. The Committee 
recommended that certain internal monitoring mechanisms should be adopted 
by quoted firms because they were more effective than others as a means of 
promoting shareholder interests. The mechanisms analysed are duality, the 
number of outside directors on the board and the presence of a remuneration 
committee. We analyse the relationship between governance structures and 
performance for two years, 1992 and 1995. Using samples of 200 companies 
for each of the years, we find that the proportion of firms adopting the 
governance structures recommended by Cadbury has increased. However 
there is mixed evidence that the structures are associated with better 
performance. Depending on the choice of dependent variable, the presence of 
a remuneration committee has a positive effect on performance and outside 
director representation has a negative effect. However, there is evidence of a 
simultaneous relationship between outside director representation and 
performance, a result consistent with additional outside directors being 
appointed after a period of poor performance. Complete compliance with the 
model of governance proposed by the Cadbury Committee does not, 
however, appear to be associated with performance which is better than that 
achieved by either partial or non compliance.  
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I. Introduction 
This paper analyses the extent to which governance structures influence firm 
performance. It assesses the relationship for two samples of UK public limited 
companies, one for 1992 and the other for 1995. The Cadbury Committee 
which published its report in 1992 (Cadbury 1992), had been set up to 
investigate corporate governance issues. In its Code of Best Practice, the 
Committee recommended a number of governance mechanisms which it 
believed would improve the corporate governance of UK companies. The year 
of the report therefore represents the governance-performance relationship 
pre-Cadbury. The 1995 results will show the extent to which recommended 
changes have been implemented and whether or not the governance-
performance relationship has changed in the post-Cadbury period. 
 
The agency model deals with issues raised by the separation of ownership 
and control whereby the principals, or shareholders, delegate authority for the 
running of the business to the agent, or management team, Fama (1980) and 
Fama and Jensen (1983). In relation to public limited companies, the model 
attempts to resolve the problem of residual control rights, brought about by 
the diffuse nature of ownership, by means of contracts. The difficulty 
encountered in this situation is that the principals and agents may have 
different objectives. Principals are assumed to be wealth maximisers whereas 
managers are assumed to treat wealth as a constraint rather than an 
objective. Consequently they attempt to achieve objectives such as growth of 
assets, sales maximisation, or the purchase of perquisites. Central to the 
agency problem is information asymmetry which means that monitoring and 
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incentive costs are incurred by the principals as they attempt to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and align manager interests with their own. 
 
It has been argued that opportunistic behaviour, which is contrary to 
shareholders’ interests, can be minimised if firms adopt certain governance 
characteristics relating to incentives and monitoring mechanisms. For 
example, in terms of incentives, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if 
senior management own significant shareholdings in the firm, their interests 
will become more closely aligned to those of other shareholders. Alternatively, 
an important monitoring mechanism is the appointment of non-executive 
directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) maintain that reputation is important to 
non-executive directors and that this ensures that they are effective monitors 
of management. The Cadbury Committee also stressed the importance of 
non-executive (outside) directors and it identified the resolution of conflict as 
one of the outside directors’ main functions. Effective monitoring mechanisms 
and appropriate incentive schemes should therefore improve corporate 
performance.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II discusses the roles of the 
various internal governance mechanisms. The variables, hypotheses and 
model are described in Section III. The results are analysed in Section IV. 
Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section V. 
 
II The Cadbury Report and Internal Governance Mechanisms  
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The Cadbury Committee was set up in 1991 to address the issues of financial 
reporting and corporate governance. Increasingly concerns had been 
expressed about matters such as the accuracy of financial reporting, 
accountability and the lack of a clear link between director pay and company 
performance. These concerns had been compounded by the sudden failure of 
a number of large quoted companies. In an attempt to address these issues, 
the Committee proposed a particular model of governance which should be 
adopted by UK quoted companies. The model was laid out in a Code of Best 
Practice which identified preferred corporate governance structures. These 
included the separation of the roles of CEO and chair, the importance of 
outside director representation and the formation of remuneration and audit 
committees. In addition, the report also highlighted the importance of 
institutional shareholders as a means of influencing the standards of 
corporate governance. Thus Cadbury proposed a specific combination of 
control and incentive mechanisms which were designed to improve 
governance and promote shareholder interests. If this model is effective, we 
would therefore expect that firms that complied with Cadbury would, as a 
result of the more effective control mechanisms, perform better than firms that 
did not do.  
  
Companies which put in place effective internal governance mechanisms 
should therefore pursue shareholders’ interests, that is, implement value-
maximising policies. If they fail to do this, the market for corporate control 
serves as an external monitoring mechanism of last resort, Fama (1980), and 
changes in ownership and governance mechanisms will be effected.  
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Outside Directors 
Although the executive directors are considered to have the necessary skills 
and expertise, Fama (1980) maintained that a board consisting wholly of 
inside directors could not adequately monitor itself and such a structure would 
merely exacerbate the agency problem. It was therefore argued that the key 
function of outside directors was to provide an effective check on the actions 
of executive directors, Fama (1980). 
 
However, whilst outside directors can bring a breadth of knowledge, 
experience and objectivity to bear upon board decisions, it may be difficult for 
them to understand the complexities of the company, particularly as outside 
directors are usually part-time and may sit on a number of other boards. For 
example, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) found that there is no link between 
board composition and performance when both relate to the same year. They 
argue that outside directors lacked the information necessary for decision-
making; did not appear to fully understand the business; and may have too 
little time to devote to their duties. Support for this comes from Yermack 
(1996) who found a negative relationship between the proportion of outside 
directors and performance. In contrast, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that 
positive abnormal returns occur when an outside director is appointed. 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that the market reaction to the 
appointment of new outside directors depends on two things: first, whether or 
not the CEO was involved in the appointment and second, the perceived 
independence of the newly appointed director. Finally Dalton et al (1998) find, 
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using meta-analysis, that board composition has no meaningful impact on 
financial performance.  
 
A number of studies have, however, suggested that the relationship between 
board structure and performance is endogenous rather than exogenous. 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) find a lagged effect between board structure and 
performance. Weisbach (1988) reports that companies that have outsider 
dominated boards are more likely to replace the CEO after a period of poor 
performance than are companies with boards that have a majority of insider 
directors, a finding supported by Borokovich et al (1996). Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) show that poor firm performance is more likely to result in 
outside directors joining the board and inside directors leaving the board. 
Bhagat and Black (1998) find a negative correlation between board 
independence and performance using both lagged and led relationships. In 
addition Bernhart et al (1994), using both OLS and instrumental variables, find 
a curvilinear relationship between board structure and performance. In 
contrast, Klein (1998) finds no link between board composition and prior 
performance.  
 
In spite of the inconclusive evidence about the beneficial effects of outsider 
representation, their importance is a central element of the Cadbury Report. It 
recommends that firms should have at least three outside directors on their 
boards. This recommendation indicates that the Committee concluded that 
the advantages of better monitoring outweighed any costs associated with the 
possible lack of specialist, company-specific knowledge. 
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Duality 
Duality refers to a board leadership structure in which the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) is also the chairman of the board. It has been argued that by 
serving as chairman, the CEO will acquire a wider powerbase and locus of 
control, thus weakening decision control by the board, Morck et al (1987). 
Duality therefore appears to impair the ability of the board to ensure that the 
board pursues goals consistent with the objectives of the shareholders.  
 
Research on the duality-performance relationship has, however, produced 
mixed results. Boyd (1995) found that combining the roles was associated 
with higher profitability. In contrast Rechner and Dalton (1991) concluded that 
combining the roles reduced profitability whereas Baliga et al (1996) and 
Dalton et al (1998) found that duality had no effect on performance. Thus, 
although duality may increase the opportunities for the potential appropriation 
of residual control rights, it does not necessarily mean that it will occur. 
 
In spite of the lack of evidence that duality had a detrimental effect on 
performance, the Cadbury Committee concluded that combining the roles was 
undesirable. In its Code of Best Practice it recommended that the roles should 
be separate and, where they were combined, there should be strong outside 
director monitoring. 
 
Internal Committees 
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Cadbury recommended the setting up of board subcommittees which were to 
assume responsibility for specific governance functions. One such 
subcommittee was the remuneration committee, the purpose of which was to 
link executive rewards more closely to performance. Main and Johnston 
(1993) found that the existence of a remuneration committee was positively 
related to performance. Klein (1998) found a weak, positive link between the 
presence of a remuneration committee and performance. However, as Dalton 
et al (1998) point out, relatively little research has been undertaken on the 
relationship between board subcommittees and performance. 
 
Internal Shareholdings 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the agency problem can be minimised 
when managers have an ownership interest in the company. This 
convergence-of-interest model maintains that, as the proportion of equity 
owned by insiders increases, the interests of management and shareholders 
become more aligned and the incentive to indulge in opportunistic behaviour 
diminishes. In this context insiders are managers and directors who, in 
addition to being shareholders, also participate in the decision-making 
process. 
 
There is evidence, however, that the relationship between management 
ownership and performance is non-linear, Morck et al (1988), McConnell and  
Servaes (1990) and Mudambi and Nicosia (1998). Thus increased director 
shareholdings could indicate the presence of managerial entrenchment . 
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External Shareholdings 
The diffuse nature of public limited companies means that most shareholders 
own a small proportion of a company’s share capital. As a result shareholders 
have little incentive either to monitor the actions of managers or to devote the 
time to challenge management’s decisions. However, the larger a 
shareholder’s stake, the greater the incentive to monitor both the decision 
plans and outcomes of managers because the potential costs associated with 
a management’s decisions are now greater, Demsetz and Lehn (1985). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Leech and Leahy (1991) all find that large 
external shareholdings are associated with improved levels of profitability and 
company performance. Further, large shareholders pose a serious threat to 
management in relation to the market for corporate control.  In this context the 
larger the shareholder, the greater is the potential to encourage a take-over 
bid which, if successful, is likely to lead to the replacement of the existing 
board members and management team. Large shareholders may also be able 
to exert influence over the board in relation to the appointment of non-
executive directors.  
 
III DATA, VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
Company names were taken from the Times 1000 for 1992 and 1995. The 
Times 1000 lists the firms with the largest sales in the UK. For each year, 200  
non-financial, fully quoted UK companies were randomly selected. The two 
samples were taken from different populations and therefore the analysis will 
not suffer from survivorship bias, Brown et al (1992) and Powell (1997).  
 
 12 
Firm performance data were taken from Extel Company Analysis. Share price 
data were taken from Extel Equity Research. Governance data were taken 
from company annual reports and the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register 
which includes coverage of all UK fully quoted companies. The Register 
provides information on board size, structure, the presence of duality, director 
shareholdings, external shareholdings in excess of 3% and whether or not a 
company has a remuneration committee1. However, there was a lack of a 
requirement for firms to disclose detailed governance information on 
committees and committee structures in 1992. Consequently, where possible, 
we telephoned companies to check the 1992 governance data. There may 
therefore be some underreporting of the extent to which remuneration 
committees existed as separate bodies. The governance data and 
performance data relate to the situations at the end of each of the 1992 and 
1995 financial years. 
 
Cadbury (1992) was published in late 1992 so that the 1992 figures represent 
the companies’ immediate pre-Cadbury governance structures. The data will 
therefore allow us to test how far the governance-performance relationship 
has changed since the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992. 
 
The general model specification is: 
Performancei = 0 + 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4X4 + i 
where  
PERFORMANCE is measured in accounting and market terms - ROA and 
RAW respectively. They are defined as: 
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ROAi - return on assets which is defined as (profit before interest and tax/total 
assets)*100 
RAWi - raw market returns measured by the percentage change in the share 
price over the financial year.  
All values are at the balance sheet date. 
X1 = a matrix of board structure variables: NNX, NX, DUAL, REM and CC 
X2 = a matrix of incentive control variables: SHARE1, SHARE1SQ and 
SHARE2 
X3 = a matrix of non-board control variables: DEBT, SIZE and BETA 
X4 = a vector of the lagged dependent variable. 
The right hand side variables are defined next along with the hypotheses 
which are based on the Cadbury Committee’s recommendations in relation to 
the preferred governance structures. 
NNXi - the number of outside (non-executive) directors on the board of each 
company. The higher the number of outside directors, the more effective they 
will be in monitoring the executive directors. We therefore expect a positive 
relationship between NNX and PERFORMANCE  
NX3i - is a binary variable. It is equal to 1 if a firm has at least three outside 
directors on its board and zero if it has less. Given that this measures one of 
Cadbury’s recommendations, we expect a positive relationship between NX3 
and PERFORMANCE. 
DUALi - is a binary variable.  If the roles of CEO and chairman are held by a 
single individual, DUAL is one and zero if they are not. Although the evidence 
is inconclusive, Cadbury suggests that duality is associated with poor 
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corporate performance and therefore, we expect a negative relationship 
between DUAL and PERFORMANCE. 
REMi - is a binary variable. If a company has a remuneration committee, REM 
is one and zero if it does not. Given that the presence of the committee should 
have a positive effect on firm performance, we expect a positive relationship 
between REM and PERFORMANCE. 
CCi - is a binary variable measuring whether or not the firm fully complies with 
the Cadbury recommendations about duality, the number of outside directors 
and the setting up of a remuneration committee. If a company has a 
remuneration committee, has a separate CEO and chair and at least three 
outside directors on the board, CC is one, and zero otherwise. We expect a 
positive relationship between CC and PERFORMANCE. 
We control for the following incentive governance variables: 
SHARE1i - measures the total percentage shareholdings of the directors. 
Because of the proposed positive link between director and shareholder 
interests, we expect a positive relationship between SHARE1 and 
PERFORMANCE. 
SHARE1SQi - is the square of the shareholdings of the directors. If 
managerial entrenchment is present, we expect a negative relationship 
between SHARE1SQ and PERFORMANCE. 
SHARE2i - measures the total of all external shareholdings in excess of 3%, 
this being the figure above which shareholdings must be declared. It is 
proposed that the larger the external shareholding, the greater the incentive to 
monitor management decisions. As monitoring increases, so agency costs 
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increase. However, assuming that the benefits are greater than the costs, we 
expect a positive link between SHARE2 and PERFORMANCE. 
 
We also control for four non-board governance variables: 
DEBTi - is total debt divided by total assets where total debt is defined as long 
term loans + short term loans. 
BETAi - calculated using the market model over the accounting year. It is the 
beta value of the market equation.  
SIZEi - is the natural log of market capitalisation. 
LDVi - dependent variable lagged one year. This allows us to take account of 
possible endogeneity between performance and board composition. 
  
IV RESULTS 
 
Insert Table I 
 
Descriptive statistics for the two years are given in Table I. For both years the 
average number of outside directors was above the minimum of three 
recommended by Cadbury. The proportion of boards with at least three 
outside directors was high in 1992 at 83% and rose to 90% in 1995. In 1992, 
29% of firms had a combined CEO and chair. By 1995, the figure had fallen to 
15% indicating a clear move away from this type of structure. There has also 
been a large increase in the percentage of firms with remuneration 
committees to 95% in 1995. The 1992 figure of 51% should be treated with 
caution because firms were not obliged to report the existence, or otherwise, 
of such committees prior to the Cadbury Report. The figure may therefore be 
an underestimate. For example, Main and Johnston (1993) using company 
 16 
accounts as a data source, found that 31% of quoted companies had a 
remuneration committee in 1990. Conyon (1994) used questionnaires and 
found a much higher incidence, 54% for 1988 and 94% for 1993. The 
proportion of firms which fully complied with Cadbury’s recommendations on 
duality, the number of non-executive directors and the setting up of 
remuneration committees increased from 38% to 74% over the period. The 
figures in Table 1 indicate that firms had moved towards governance 
structures consistent with the Cadbury model. The control variables show a 
fall in debt, a slightly lower beta and an increase in the average size of firms. 
 
Insert Table II 
Table II compares the mean values of the governance variables and hence 
enables us to assess the extent to which there have been significant changes 
in the relevant governance mechanisms over the period. The fall in the 
incidence of companies having the same person as CEO and chairman is 
significant at the 1% level with only 15% of firms combining the roles by 1995. 
Although the number of non-executive directors has increased, the increase is 
not statistically significant. The proportion of companies having at least three 
non-executive directors is higher in 1995, now 90%, with the difference being 
significant at the 10% level. There has also been a significant increase, at the 
1% level, in the proportion of firms with a remuneration committee. There has 
been a significant increase in the proportion of firms that have adopted all of 
the recommendations, again at the 1% level. Average director shareholdings 
increased, but the increase was not significant. There was a small, 
insignificant fall in the average external shareholdings. 
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The univariate analysis shows that firms have moved towards adopting the 
governance structures recommended by Cadbury. Regression analysis was 
then used to test the general governance-performance relationship for both 
years to find out if these mechanisms have a significant impact on company 
performance.  
 
Insert Table III 
Table III gives results for the accounting performance measure, return on 
assets. Two equations are presented for each year because of the high 
correlation between the two outside director variables. The first includes NX3, 
the variable which splits boards into those with at least three outside directors 
and those with fewer, and the second includes the number of outside directors 
on the board, NNX. The results show DUAL is insignificant for both years 
showing that firms that separate the posts do not perform better than those 
that combine them. NX3 is negative but insignificant in 1992 but is negative 
and significant in 1995. Thus the move towards adopting the minimum 
recommended number of outside directors has had an unexpectedly 
detrimental effect on performance. In addition, increasing the number of non 
executives, NNX, has had a significant but negative impact on performance 
for both years. This is also contrary to expectations and suggests that the 
calibre of the non-executives may be more important than simply the number. 
 
However, an alternative interpretation is possible. The lagged dependent 
variable is also significant which suggests that the relationship between 
 18 
performance and outside director representation is endogenous. Thus the 
result is consistent with additional outside directors being appointed in 
response to poor performance, a finding consistent with Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988). 
 
A number of the control variables are significant. Incentive effects appear to 
be present in 1995 with SHARE1, director shareholdings, being positive and 
significant. There is also some evidence of director entrenchment in 1995 with 
SHARE1SQ being negative and significant. SHARE2, external shareholdings, 
is positive and significant  in 1992 but it becomes insignificant in 1995. SIZE is 
positive and significant  at the 1% level for both years. BETA is negative and 
weakly significant in 1992 but insignificant in 1995. All models are significant 
at the 1% level. 
 
Insert Table IV 
Table IV gives the results for the market performance measure, raw returns. 
DUAL, NX3 and NNX are insignificant for both years. Of the Cadbury 
variables only REM is significant, and positive, and then only for 1995. There 
is no evidence of shareholder incentive effects. SIZE was positively and 
significantly  linked to performance in 1992. DEBT is negative and significant 
for both years indicating that the market regards the higher costs of greater 
debt as having a negative impact on performance. LDV was negative and 
significant at the 1% level in 1995.  All models have significant F values but 
the R2 is low. 
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The initial results show that, individually, only some of the governance 
mechanisms recommended by Cadbury have an effect on performance. The 
relationship was investigated further by generating a number of interactive 
terms to assess the impact of combinations of Cadbury compliance on 
performance. In addition to CC (defined earlier), three new interactive 
variables were created: 
CC1 - a binary variable which has a value of 1 if a company has at least three 
non executive directors and a remuneration committee. If not, it is zero. 
CC2 - a binary variable which has a value of 1 if a company has at least three 
non executive directors and a dual CEO-chair. If not, it is zero. 
CC3 - a binary variable which has a value of 1 if a company has a dual CEO-
chair and a remuneration committee. If not, it is zero. 
 
The results are reported in Tables V and VI. 
  
The 1992 results for both performance measures are given in Table V and 
show that there is no real evidence to support the governance model 
proposed at the time the Cadbury Report was published, whether 
performance is measured in accounting or in market terms. CC is insignificant 
for both performance measures, which shows that firms that complied fully 
with Cadbury’s recommendations, performed no better than those that did not. 
The interactive terms are also insignificant which shows that partial 
compliance neither improves nor harms performance. The only board 
structure variable that is significant is NNX, but then only at the 10% level. 
This indicates that increasing the number of outside directors has a negative 
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impact on performance. The significant lagged dependent variable, however, 
indicates evidence of endogeneity, which suggests that outside directors are 
added after a period of poor performance. The results show that there is no 
compelling evidence that, at the time the Cadbury Committee was making its 
recommendations, the proposed governance model performed more 
effectively than others. Of the non-Cadbury variables, SIZE and SHARE2 are 
significant if accounting performance is used. If market performance is used, 
no structural corporate governance variable is significant with only SIZE and 
DEBT being significant.  
Insert Table VI 
The 1995 results for both performance measures are given in Table VI. They 
show that the governance-performance relationship has changed very little 
over the intervening years. Complete compliance does not lead to better 
performance and, as in 1992, partial compliance neither harms nor benefits 
performance. The accounting measure of performance shows that the 
negative relationship between outside directors and performance has become 
more pronounced with both NX3 and NNX now being negative and significant. 
However, there is still evidence of endogeneity with LDV again being 
significant. The control variable SIZE remains significant and there is evidence 
of director entrenchment with SHARE1SQ being negative and significant. As 
in 1992, market performance does not appear to be influenced by the extent 
of Cadbury compliance with none of the variables being significant. Only 
DEBT and LDV of the control variables are significant. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
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We undertook a number of further analyses in an attempt to assess how 
sensitive the results were to changes in method and variable definition.  First, 
the use of different companies in each of the years, and the increased 
acceptance of Cadbury’s recommendations, may be subject to sample 
selection bias. One way to address this problem would be to compare the 
governance-performance relationship of the same companies at the different 
years. We identified a subsample of 103 companies that appeared in both 
years and reran the analyses. The results were similar to those reported 
above. There is evidence that the companies have adopted the internal 
mechanisms recommended by Cadbury. However regression analysis finds a 
weaker governance-performance relationship with none of the governance 
variables being statistically significant.2 The lack of clear cut relationship 
between the internal governance mechanisms and performance is therefore 
robust and is found to hold using both methodological approaches.  
 
Second, Cadbury recommends that boards should have at least three non-
executive directors. However, rather than number, an alternative measure of 
the strength of their representation is the percentage of the board that are 
non-executive directors.  When this was included instead of the other 
measures of non-executive director representation, it was found to be 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Third, in addition to assessing the impact that the presence of a remuneration 
committee had on performance, we also analysed whether or not having the 
CEO on the remuneration committee had an impact on performance. The 
presence of such an officeholder may inhibit the decision-making processes of 
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the committee and so may harm performance. However, we found that the 
presence of the CEO on the committee had no statistical effect on 
performance.  
 
V CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Cadbury Report made a number of important recommendations relating 
to the desirability, or otherwise, of certain internal monitoring mechanisms. 
The objective of the Report was to improve the quality of monitoring and 
hence to enable the users of company-specific information to be better 
informed. This was to be achieved by means of a Code of Best Practice, 
which firms were expected to adopt.  
 
These results confirm those of Conyon and Mallin (1997) that firms have, to a 
large extent, complied with the Code in terms of duality, the number of outside 
directors on the board and the appointment of board subcommittees. 
However, the results show that complete compliance with the model proposed 
by Cadbury does not appear to result in superior performance when 
compared to the performance achieved by either partial or non compliance. 
This holds true for the situations at the time the report was being published 
and in the subsequent years. The impacts of the Cadbury variables also 
appear to depend on which type of performance measure is used. Market 
returns are higher if firms have a remuneration committee but this is not 
reflected in the return on assets. Similarly, outside director representation is 
negatively related to accounting performance but not to market returns. Thus 
the choice of performance measure has important implications for 
understanding the impact of governance structures. This is extremely 
 23 
important because there is evidence that the relationship between accounting 
performance and outside director representation is endogenous. 
 
Although the Code is voluntary, it is a condition laid down by the London 
Stock Exchange that quoted firms must explain their governance policies and 
give reasons for not complying with it. This public justification may explain 
some of the increase in compliance. Thus by concentrating on the 
mechanisms recommended by Cadbury, firms may have been unable to 
implement alternative, more effective, internal monitoring mechanisms that 
were appropriate in the specific circumstances. 
 
In 1992, the UK economy was coming out of recession and in 1995 it was in 
the upswing phase of the cycle. The results are therefore consistent across 
the phases of the economic cycle with more variables remaining insignificant 
than becoming significant. The impact of the economic cycle may have a 
greater impact on the personnel rather than the structure of the governance 
mechanisms and an area of further research would be to investigate changes 
in membership. For example, if an outside director replaced one who had left, 
the structure would not change but the dynamics of the board probably would.  
 
The results point the way to areas of further research. First, a three-year time 
frame is used in this study. However, the lag between changing the 
governance structure of a company and seeing an effect on corporate 
performance may be longer. This may be particularly true for accounting 
performance measures. A greater understanding of the role, and length of 
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time lags, may provide useful insights into the governance-performance 
relationship. Second, further analysis of the characteristics of the board and 
its committees may provide further insights into the effectiveness of 
governance structures. For example, analysing the impact of the quality and 
degree of independence of the board committees on performance may yield 
additional insights into the relationship. Third, rather than concentrate on 
structures, we may need to achieve a greater understanding of the processes 
of corporate governance. This would develop the debate by taking account of 
the ways in which corporate governance structures actually operate rather 
than concentrating on their structural set up.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. We also obtained information on audit committees. However, we 
subsequently found that there was a substantial overlap in the presence of the 
committees. In 1992, of the 100 companies which had a remuneration 
committee, 99 also had an audit committee. In 1995, of the 190 companies 
which had a remuneration committee, 188 also had an audit committee. The 
high degree of multicollinearity between the variables resulted in only the 
remuneration committee variable being included. Regressions were also run 
using the audit committees but the results were not significantly different to 
those achieved by using the remuneration committee variable. 
2. For reasons of space, we do not report the results here. They are available 
from the authors on request. 
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Table I 
Descriptive statistics 
  Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
NNX 1992 0 10 4.19 1.78 
 1995 0 12 4.25 1.88 
NX3 1992 0 1 0.83 0.37 
 1995 0 1 0.90 0.30 
DUAL 1992 0 1 0.29 0.45 
 1995 0 1 0.15 0.35 
REM 1992 0 1 0.51 0.50 
 1995 0 1 0.95 0.22 
CC 1992 0 1 0.38 0.47 
 1995 0 1 0.74 0.43 
SHARE1 (%) 1992 0 59.02 2.52 7.25 
 1995 0.01 58.78 2.84 7.48 
SHARE2 (%) 1992 0 88.35 22.61 16.45 
 1995 0 81.90 21.96 17.43 
DEBT (%) 1992 0 128.5 23.75 14.85 
 1995 0 93 19.77 12.62 
BETA 1992 -1.93 3.35 1.20 0.66 
 1995 -1.46 3.44 1.02 0.75 
SIZE (£m) 1992 20 19311 1753.76 3154.70 
 1995 36 30659 1830.39 3994.82 
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Table II 
Governance characteristics 
 
Variable Mean Mean T-Value 
 1992 1995  
DUAL 0.29 0.15 3.44*** 
NNX 4.19 4.25 1.27 
NX3 0.83 0.90 1.82* 
REM 0.51 0.95 9.33*** 
CC 0.38 0.74 6.53*** 
SHARE1 (%) 2.52 2.84 0.43 
SHARE2 (%) 22.61 21.96 0.40 
 
*** - significant at 1%; * - significant at 10% 
Wilcoxon test used for binary variables NX3, DUAL, REM and CC 
 31 
Table III Regression results - Governance characteristics and accounting 
performance  
Independent 
Variable 
1992 
ROA 
1992 
ROA 
1995 
ROA 
1995 
ROA 
DUAL -0.0689 
(0.08) 
0.0918 
(0.10) 
-4.2647 
(0.91) 
-4.3711 
(0.92) 
REM -1.1788 
(1.25) 
-1.0810 
(1.16) 
2.3428 
(0.90) 
1.8064 
(0.68) 
NX3 -2.2348 
(1.42) 
 -3.9402 
(2.24)** 
 
NNX  -0.6014 
(1.95)* 
 -1.0177 
(2.15)** 
SHARE1 0.0780 
(0.77) 
0.0865 
(0.93) 
0.2027 
(1.98)** 
0.2436 
(2.80)*** 
SHARE1SQ -0.0016 
(0.80) 
-0.0020 
(1.05) 
-0.0036 
(1.50) 
-0.0038 
(2.11)** 
SHARE2 0.0658 
(2.23)** 
0.0702 
(2.47)** 
-0.0048 
(0.20) 
-0.0034 
(1.49) 
SIZE 1.5746 
(4.18)*** 
1.7396 
(4.29)*** 
1.3381 
(3.27)*** 
1.9068 
(3.23)*** 
DEBT -0.0413 
(1.18) 
-0.0344 
(0.98) 
-0.0683 
(1.69)* 
-0.0556 
(1.43) 
BETA -0.8920 
(1.54) 
-1.1269 
(1.80)* 
-1.5777 
(1.12) 
-2.0908 
(1.30) 
LDV 0.5321 
(5.50)*** 
0.5143 
(5.06)*** 
0.5504 
(4.40)*** 
0.5238 
(4.70)*** 
CONSTANT -4.6959 
(1.74)* 
-5.0181 
(1.93)* 
0.5893 
(0.17) 
-1.2267 
(0.38) 
R2 42 36 23 24 
F value 13.69*** 14.03*** 5.65*** 5.94*** 
 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
t values in parentheses calculated from heteroscedasticity corrected standard 
errors  (White 1980) 
 
Table IV 
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Regression results - Governance characteristics and market performance 
 
Independent variable 
1992 
RAW 
1992 
RAW 
1995 
RAW 
1995 
RAW 
DUAL -2.3256 
(0.40) 
-5.0586 
(0.91) 
5.9757 
(1.31) 
6.2291 
(1.39) 
REM -0.7308 
(0.11) 
0.8936 
(0.12) 
28.0310 
(2.31)** 
27.5700 
(2.47)*** 
NX3 9.2776 
(1.16) 
 0.2954 
(0.01) 
 
NNX  -2.5806 
(1.47) 
 0.7540 
(0.47) 
SHARE1 1.3618 
(1.47) 
1.0918 
(1.22) 
0.0892 
(0.13) 
0.1450 
(0.23) 
SHARE1SQ -00248 
(1.40) 
-0.0212 
(1.35) 
-00067 
(0.56) 
-0.0085 
(0.74) 
SHARE2 0.1765 
(0.80) 
0.2647 
(1.02) 
0.0869 
(0.60) 
0.0853 
(0.57) 
SIZE 6.7863 
(3.35)*** 
8.8766 
(4.33)*** 
0.8083 
(0.28) 
0.3322 
(0.08) 
DEBT -0.3440 
(1.86)* 
-0.3373 
(1.73)* 
-0.3996 
(2.24)** 
-0.4159 
(2.33)** 
BETA 10.1590 
(1.76)* 
9.8169 
(1.19) 
-5.0322 
(0.91) 
-4.5462 
(0.91) 
LDV 0.0001 
(0.10) 
-0.0009 
(0.09) 
-0.1561 
(2.62)*** 
-0.1578 
(2.68)*** 
CONSTANT -57.0970 
(2.76)*** 
-53.2100 
(2.57)*** 
-16.6310 
(0.72) 
-16.432 
(0.71) 
R2 9 10 11 11 
F value 2.00* 2.09* 2.42** 2.45** 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
t values in parentheses calculated from heteroscedasticity corrected standard 
errors (White 1980) 
 
Table V Regression results - Performance and Cadbury compliant board 
structures - 1992 
 ROA RAW 
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CC -1.3094 
(1.34) 
    6.658 
(0.93) 
    
CC1  -1.2264 
(1.41) 
    4.4323 
(0.63) 
   
DUAL  0.2671 
(0.29) 
    -3.4961 
(0.62) 
   
CC2   -1.0414 
(1.13) 
    6.3438 
(1.18) 
  
REM   -1.2291 
(1.34) 
    -0.5767 
(0.08) 
  
CC3    -1.1124 
(1.26) 
-1.2186 
(1.34) 
   6.5607 
(0.91) 
3.9035 
(0.56) 
NNX    -0.5686 
(1.93)* 
    -2.7030 
(1.44) 
 
NX3     -2.1193 
(1.34) 
    9.1978 
(1.18) 
SHARE1 0.1102 
(1.02) 
0.1126 
(1.03) 
0.0964 
(0.93) 
0.0796 
(0.76) 
0.0696 
(0.66) 
1.3341 
(1.45) 
1.3084 
(1.41) 
1.2961 
(1.43) 
1.1778 
(1.32) 
1.14479 
(1.55) 
SHARE1SQ -0.0021 
(1.05) 
-0.0022 
(1.16) 
-0.0019 
(0.96) 
-0.0018 
(0.97) 
-0.0014 
(o.70) 
-0.0253 
(1.47) 
-0.0246 
(1.44) 
-0.0239 
(1.43) 
-0.0235 
(1.44) 
-0.0269 
(1.53) 
SHARE2 0.0593 
(2.26)*** 
0.0569 
(2.15)** 
0.0596 
(2.11)** 
0.0715 
(2.59)** 
0.0671 
(2.38)** 
0.2284 
(1.06) 
0.2317 
(1.05) 
0.1996 
(0.91) 
0.2812 
(1.30) 
0.1839 
(0.86) 
SIZE 1.3464 
(3.72)*** 
1.3847 
(3.81)*** 
1.4242 
(4.09)*** 
1.6942 
(3.95)** 
1.5271 
(2.71)*** 
7.0414 
(3.87)*** 
6.9995 
(3.84)*** 
7.3731 
(3.99)*** 
8.5578 
(4.13)*** 
6.4209 
(3.24)*** 
DEBT -0.0370 
(1.05) 
-0.0369 
(1.03) 
-0.0424 
(1.17) 
-0.0341 
(0.97) 
-0.0409 
(1.16) 
-0.3595 
(1.95)* 
-0.3578 
(1.93)* 
-0.3353 
(1.80)* 
-0.3372 
(1.75)* 
-0.3432 
(1.87)* 
BETA -0.9991 
(1.69)* 
-0.9752 
(1.60) 
-0.8805 
(1.52) 
-1.1307 
(1.93)* 
-0.8884 
(1.57) 
10.6060 
(1.28) 
10.3380 
(1.24) 
10.1770 
(1.23) 
10.0890 
(1.23) 
10.2240 
(1.23) 
LDV 0.5296 
(5.09)*** 
0.5316 
(5.13)*** 
0.5300 
(5.25)*** 
0.5144 
(5.03)**
* 
0.5317 
(5.44)*** 
-0.0002 
(0.18) 
-0.0001 
(0.10) 
-0.0001 
(0.10) 
-0.0003 
(0.27) 
-0.0001 
(0.10) 
CONSTANT -5.1096 
(1.95)* 
 
-5.3452 
(1.95)* 
-4.7928 
(1.84)* 
-4.9160 
(1.96)* 
-4.6813 
(1.80)* 
-55.5790 
(2.67)*** 
-53.7880 
(2.63)** 
-58.5660 
(2.79)*** 
-55.0370 
(2.63)*** 
-57.5520 
(2.79)*** 
R2 
 
40 40 41 42 42 9 9 9 10 9 
F value 16.56*** 
 
14.62*** 14.91*** 11.19**
* 
15.32*** 2.64** 2.15** 2.17** 2.38*** 2.26** 
 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
t values in parentheses calculated from heteroscedasticity corrected standard 
errors (White 1980) 
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Table VI Regression results - Performance and Cadbury compliant board 
structures 1995 
ROA RAW 
CC 2.8526 
(0.91) 
    0.9152 
(0.17) 
    
CC1  -1.5289 
(0.76) 
    -
5.2418 
(1.24) 
   
DUAL  -4.2125 
(0.90) 
    6.4821 
(0.82) 
   
CC2   2.2840 
(0.63) 
    -6.2330 
(0.99) 
  
REM   0.9746 
(0.31) 
    -6.2306 
(1.35) 
  
CC3    4.4849 
(1.12) 
4.4020 
(1.11) 
   -3.3681      
(0.76) 
2.5439 
(0.46) 
NNX    -1.0448 
(2.04)** 
    -1.3156 
(1.07) 
 
NX3     -3.9235 
(1.95)* 
    4.3088 
(0.52) 
SHARE1 0.3973 
(2.30)** 
0.2796 
(2.60)*** 
0.3917 
(2.02)** 
0.2581 
(2.80)*** 
0.2192 
(2.12)** 
0.0695 
(0.10) 
-0.1268 
(0.18) 
-0.9987 
(1.46) 
-0.1029 
(0.14) 
0.1864 
(0.28) 
SHARE1SQ -0.0076 
(2.37)** 
-0.0050 
(1.92)* 
-0.0075 
(2.20)** 
-0.0040 
(2.35)** 
-0.0039 
(1.62) 
-0.0045 
(0.38) 
-0.0010 
(0.07) 
-0.0015 
(0.11) 
-0.0018 
(0.14) 
-0.0067 
(0.54) 
SHARE2 -0.0062 
(0.28) 
-0.0003 
(0.31) 
-0.0054 
(0.24) 
-0.0039 
(0.17) 
-0.0050 
(0.21) 
0.0984 
(0.66) 
0.0498 
(0.27) 
0.0395 
(0.21) 
0.0637 
(0.37) 
0.0958 
(0.39) 
SIZE 1.1046 
(3.58)*** 
1.336 
(3.36)*** 
 
1.1247 
(3.27)*** 
1.8815 
(3.98)*** 
1.3195 
(3.86)*** 
2.0970 
(0.78) 
1.4012 
(0.48) 
1.6009 
(0.53) 
1.6654 
(0.61) 
1.9076 
(0.70) 
DEBT -0.0659 
(1.62) 
-0.0693 
(1.72) 
-0.0674 
(1.69)* 
-0.0501 
(1.23) 
-0.0613 
(1.46) 
-0.3824 
(2.17)** 
 
-0.3497 
(1.92)* 
-0.3375 
(1.83)* 
-o.3588 
(1.95)* 
-0.3931 
(2.22)** 
BETA -1.2453 
(0.99) 
-1.4020 
(1.00) 
 
-1.2320 
(1.02) 
-2.0871 
(1.28) 
-1.5443 
(1.10) 
-4.5688 
(0.83) 
-3.8550 
(0.64) 
-3.6375 
(0.62) 
-3.8284 
(0.64) 
-4.5656 
(0.83) 
LDV 0.5783 
(4.26)*** 
0.5571 
(4.50)*** 
 
0.5769 
(4.34)*** 
0.5432 
(4.65)*** 
0.5556 
(4.29)**
* 
-0.1461 
(2.59)*** 
-0.1510 
(2.56)*** 
-0.1499 
(2.62)*** 
-0.1424 
(2.52)*** 
-0.1841 
(2.64)*** 
CONSTANT -2.9514 
(0.76) 
 
0.0416 
(0.01) 
-3.5999 
(0.92 
-3.7183 
(0.87) 
-1.5343 
(0.41) 
0.9777 
(0.03) 
6.8699 
(0.30) 
12.0180 
(0.80) 
10.9900 
(0.37) 
-2.9881 
(0.12) 
R2 21 
 
22 21 24 23 8 9 9 9 8 
F value 6.58*** 
 
6.06*** 5.70*** 6.73*** 6.38*** 2.03** 1.94** 2.01** 1.81* 1.86* 
 
***  significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
t values in parentheses calculated from heteroscedasticity corrected standard 
errors (White 1980) 
 
